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This paper provides evidence on whether the minimum wage (MW) has affected
gender wage gaps in urban China. Several major conclusions emerge. First, from
1995 to 2007, the proportion of workers whose wages were below the regional
MW level was greater for female workers than for male workers. Second, the
results obtained by using the difference-in-differences estimation method show
that from a long-term perspective, the MW will help to reduce gender wage
gaps and that the effect is more obvious for the low-wage group. However, in
the short term, the amelioration effect is not obvious.
JEL classification: J31, J48, J71
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Does the minimum wage (MW) policy that has been enforced since 1993 affect gender
wage differentials in China? In this paper, we provide evidence on this issue. We focus
on the effect of MW policy on the gender wage gaps1 for the following two reasons.
First, the implementation of the MW, in theory, may increase the income of low-
wage workers and is beneficial to reduce poverty. Therefore, the MW is enacted as an
important labor policy. To examine the policy effect, many empirical analyses have
been conducted in other countries. In contrast, although the MW has been in effect
since 1993 in China, empirical analysis of it using micro-data is rare.
Second, while the main objective of MW implementation is to increase the wage
level of low-wage groups, most studies only focus on the effect of MW on low-skill
worker employment2 (which appears to be the most important issue). Moreover, these
studies overlook the effect of MW on wage gaps, particularly gender wage gaps. The
effects of the MW on gender wage gap depend on many factors. Some of these factors
include, the gender gap in the proportion of workers whose wages are below the
regional MW level and the gender gap between actual wages and the MW level before
the implementation of the MW (Robinson 2002, 2005). Therefore, although the imple-
mentation of the MW does not imply a reduction of gender wage gap in theory, we
need to verify its effects through an empirical analysis.
This paper attempts to answer the following questions through an empirical analysis
using micro-data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) survey. First, is the
proportion of the population with wages below the MW level greater for males than2015 Li and Ma. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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for males? Second, would different MW levels adopted in various regions lead to a
regional difference in gender wage gap? Third, does the MW system affect gender wage
gap? What are the effects of endowment differentials? What are the effects of endow-
ment return differentials? Fourth, has the MW system, which was implemented in
1993, affected the gender wage gap? If it has, is there a difference in short-term and
long-term effects? Because we use the cross-sectional micro survey data from three
periods, a repeated cross-section analysis should also investigate the changes (if any) in
the abovementioned issues along with policy changes. Considering that the MW pri-
marily affects low-income groups, we employ different models to conduct the analysis
on average wages and wage distribution.
This paper is structured as follows. Part II introduce the implementation of the MW
in China, Part III reviews the literature. Part IV describes analysis methods, includ-
ing introduction to data and models. Part V answer the first question presented
above using statistical description results. Part VI states the quantitative analysis
results to answer the second, third and fourth questions. Part VII presents the
main conclusions.
2 The implementation of the MW in China
In China, since the 1980s, there has been increasing migration from rural to urban
areas, which has been accompanied by an increase in the low wages of migrants and a
rise in income inequality. To deal with these social problems, the MW policy was first
promulgated as a law in 1993. The MW is applicable to two kinds of wages, the
monthly wage and the hourly wage. Minimum monthly wage standards are applied to
regular workers, while the minimum hourly wage is applied to non-regular workers.
Wage, which is defined by the MW policy, is the basic wage with the exception of over-
time work payment and some allowances.
As per policy, the MW level is determined by the regional government, the union,
and the representatives of companies. However, in reality, MW levels are determined
primarily by the regional governments.
The MW level is adjusted once every two years, according to many factors such
as the regional lowest living cost, consumer price index of urban residents, social
insurance, the housing fund that individual workers are paid, the regional average
wage level, the status of economic development, and employment status. The ad-
justment of the MW level is carried out by the local government (province or city
governments); as a result, there are regional disparities. For example, the MW level
is higher in the eastern regions as compared to the western and central regions,
and the increase within these bands of the MW levels are also different across re-
gions (see Fig. 1). These regional disparities allow us to use a quasi-natural experi-
ment model to prove the effects of MW. We will provide detailed explanations
about this in the following paragraphs.
Although the government enforced the implementation of the MW, there are no
penalties for violations; hence, there are several compliance problems and MW is not
thoroughly implemented in the private sector. These compliance problems account for
the phenomenon of workers with wages below the prescribed level, although the MW
has been in existence since 1993.
Fig. 1 Regional Disparities of the MW levels (2004 and 2006). Source: published information by each
regional governments
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There are a large number of empirical studies of the effects of the MW on employment,
but the studies on wage distribution are scarce. The studies related to the empirical
analyses in this paper are reviewed in the following.
DiNardo et al. (1996) conducted studies on the effects of a MW on a wage gap. In
particular, they assumed other things equal to evaluate the wage distribution in 1988
based on the fixed MW level in 1979, and then compared the 1979 level with the actual
level in 1988 to reveal the effects of the MW system on a wage gap. The analysis shows
that there is an increase in the wage gap in 1988 compared with 1979; the decrease of
the MW level results in an increased wage gap (17% for male, 24% for female). Card
and Krueger (1995) conducted a study on the effects of changes in the MW level from
1989 to 1992 on changes in wage gaps in the U.S. Using a natural experiment model
based on the MW system change, in which the MW level was increased in some states
in 1990 and 1991, they indicated that the Minimum Wage Act pulled up the incomes
of low-wage workers and narrowed the regional wage gap.
In addition, to investigate the effects of the MW on gender wage gap, Robinson
(2002, 2005) uses the British Labor Force Survey data from 1997 to 2000 to study the
effects of the MW implemented throughout the country in April 1999 on gender wage
gap. The analysis, based on a quasi-DID model (using London, whose gender wage gap
is the smallest before the implementation of the MW, as a control group and other
regions as treatment groups), shows that the effects of the MW on gender wage gap
vary in different regions. Shannon (1996) utilized the Canadian Labor Force Survey
data in 1986 and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to conduct a relevant
study that shows that the MW narrowed the gender wage gap among the population
aged 16 to 24 but had little effect on those aged 25 to 64.
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gap in urban China. Our study may address this lack to a certain extent.
4 Methodology and data
4.1 Model
(1)Robinson model for the effects of the MW on gender wage gap
Robinson (2002, 2005) established a model to analyze the effects of the MW system
on gender wage gap in the UK. This model is primarily used to show that there are two
reasons for the effects of the MW on gender wage gap. First, the MW level (MW) has
various effects on wage distribution:
Wi ¼ Wi if W i > MW
Wi ¼ MW if W i ≤MW ð1:1Þ
Equation (1) shows that for groups with a wage greater than the MW level (Wi >MW)before the implementation of the MW, the wage remains the same after such implemen-
tation; whereas, for those with a wage lower than the MW level W i ≤MW
 
before the
implementation, the wage increases to the MW level after such implementation. As a
result, the average wage after the implementation of the MW should be a composite value
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Equation (3) indicates that there are two reasons for the changes in average wagebefore and after the implementation of the MW: the number of workers with wages
lower than the MW level and the gap between the actual wage and the MW level.
Consequently, the gender wage gap before the implementation of the MW can be
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and (5). i. When the number of females is greater than that of males among
workers having wages lower than the MW level before the implementation of the
MW, and ii. When the gap between actual wages and the MW level for females is
greater than that for males before the implementation of the MW, such an imple-
mentation may contribute to narrowing the gender wage gap at the low-wage
distribution.
Because i. and ii. stated above are only assumptions, the implementation of the MW
does not imply a certain reduction of gender wage gap in theory. Further investigations
must be conducted with the following models.
(2)Estimates of gender wage gap of regions by the MW level
Based on the MW level, we classified the samples into high MW regions, medium
MW regions and low MW regions3 to estimate the wage function. The wage function
is represented with Eq. (6).
1nWijt ¼ aijt þ βXijt þ εijt ð2:1Þ
In Eq. (6), i represents individual workers, t represents periods and j represents threecategories of regions (high MW regions, middle WM regions and low MW regions). X
is other variables affecting wages (such as education and work experience as a proxy
for human capital, or male dummy variable), a is a constant, ε is an error term and β
represents the coefficient estimates of variables. Using coefficients of the male dummy
estimated by regional sub-groups, we compare the regional differentials of gender wage
gaps.4
To see the different effects by wage distribution, we adopt the Quantile Regression
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ð2:2Þ
In Eq. (7), i represents individual workers, and θ represents quantile of wages(1% quantile is expressed as 1th). The equation’s other variables are the same as
those of Eq. (6). ρθ (.) is a check (or indicator) function. The QR model is de-
signed for estimation using the optimal method, which minimizes the two error
terms in Eq. (7).
(3)Decomposition model for the effects of the MW level on gender wage gaps
To decompose the effect on gender wage gaps, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
method5 (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) is commonly used. However, Cotton (1988);
Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) note that the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position method using estimated coefficient and average values of males or females
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Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition model (Oaxaca and Ransom 1994).
1nWm−1nWf ¼ Xm−Xf
 




In Eq. (8), m represents males, f represents females, lnW is the logarithm of the aver-age wage, X is the average of variables, and βm and βf represent the estimated coeffi-
cients resulting from the wage function of males and females, respectively. Note the β*
(no-discrimination wage structure) therein, which is a gender-neutral coefficient esti-
mated based on wage functions using the entire sample. Concerning the Oaxaca and
Ransom model, Xm−Xf
 
β represents the gender wage gap resulting from a difference




gap caused by too-low endowment return of females (known as “female loss”) and
Xm βm−β
  represents the gap generated by too-high endowment return of males
(known as “male gain”). The sum of these two decomposition values stands for the
gender wage gap resulting from differences in endowment return, including dis-
crimination.6 We add the variable of the MW levels and Kaitz Index7 in this model
to decompose these MW factors’ effects on gender wage gap.
(4)DID analysis for the effects of the MW on gender wage gap
Although the effect of the MW on gender wage gap can be decomposed by the
endowment difference and endowment returns difference as described above, it is
necessary to provide evidence on whether the MW has affected gender wage differen-
tials. Here, we apply the DID model, which is frequently used for policy evaluation.
DID analysis8 can be represented as follows:
lnWijt ¼ aþ γxXijt þ γyeY earij þ γtrTreatijt þ γmMaleijt þ γyetrYear  Treatijt
þ γyemYear Maleijt þ γtrmTreat Maleijt þ γdidDIDijt þ vijt ð4Þ
In Eq. (9), i stands for the individual, t for years, j represents categories of regions,
Year for policy implementation years (1995, 2002 and 2007 in this paper), Treat for the
treatment group, Male for the male dummy variable, a is the constant term, and v is
the error term. γ represents the estimated coefficient for each variable.
We used the retrospective data of CHIP1995 to gain wages information for the previ-
ous five years and generated several treatment groups and control groups.9 Specifically,
we use the years before the implementation of the MW (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and
1994) as the initial years and the years of 1995, 2002 and 2007 as the policy implant-
ation years. We distinguish the treatment group and control group.
We sampled districts with relatively large gender wage gaps in the initial years before
the implementation of the MW and relatively high MW levels (where the value of Kaitz
index is higher) during the implementation years as the simulation treatment groups. It
is thought that the MW should provide the largest effect to this group. For example,
using the 1990–1995 data, we defined Henan province as a treatment group because
the gender wage gap is largest in 1990, as the ratio of female and male wage is
0.78, while in other districts it is 0.80 ~ 0.86; accordingly, the Kaitz index is highest
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districts with relatively small gender wage gaps during the initial years and a MW
level lower than that of the treatment group in the policy implementation years as
a control group. In this case, the MW should have the smallest effect on these
groups. Since 1993, MW was implemented across all districts in China; therefore,
we cannot treat a non-implementation district as a treatment group (this is the
strict definition). Accordingly, we defined the treatment groups as the district most
impacted by the MW implementation.10
Here, the DID item is the cross term of the three items used—male, the policy
implementation years and treatment group (Male * Year * Treat). If the estimated
coefficient of DID is statistically significant, it indicates that the implementation of
the MW has an effect on gender wage gap. If the estimated coefficient is a nega-
tive value, it shows that the MW system has some effect on reducing gender wage
gap, and vice versa.
4.2 Data
CHIP1995, 2002, 2007 are used for the analysis. These data are gained from the three
surveys of the CHIP conducted by NBS, Economic Institute of CASS and Beijing
Normal University, including respective information about employment and wages of
urban residents. Using retrospective survey data of income in CHIP1995, we can differ-
entiate the years before and after the MW implementation to analyze the treatment
group and control group.
Because there are design similarities of the data in the questionnaire, we can use the
same information for analysis for all three periods. To make comparisons in three
periods, we selected the regions (provinces) covered in all three surveys, including
Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan,
and Gansu.11
The wage12 is defined as the total earnings from work (called “the total wage”). Here,
it comprises the basic wage, bonus, cash subsidy, and no cash subsidy.13 We use the
CPI in 1995 as the standard, and adjust the nominal wage in 2002 and 2007.
The analytic objects of this paper are employees, excluding the self-employer and the
unemployed. Considering the retirement system of the state-owned sector, to reduce
the effect of that system on the analysis result, the analytic objects are limited in the
groups to between the ages of 16 and 60.
In the wage function, the explained variable is the logarithm of the monthly wage,14
and the explaining variables are the variables likely to affect the wage, such as educa-
tion (primary school or below, junior high school, senior high school/vocational school,
college, university15 and above), experience years,16 ownership (state-owned enterprises,
collectively owned enterprises, foreign/private enterprises), occupation (manager, tech-
nician, clerk, manual worker), industry (agriculture, fishing & forestry, manufacturing,
mining, construction, transportation/communication, wholesale, retail, and catering,
real estate, health and social welfare, education, culture, and arts, financial industry,
public management and social organizations, and other industries).
We apply the Chinese National Minimum Wage Databases to classify the regions by
the MW level, as shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows sample statistical descriptions by
gender groups.
Table 1 Regional classification by the MW levels
Low-MW region Mid-MW region High-MW region
1995年 level 160-165 Yuan 165-175 Yuan over 175 Yuan
regions Shanxi, Anhui, Shichuan,
Yunnan, Gansu
Jiangsu, Hernan, Hubei Beijing, Liaoning
2002年 level 225-285 Yuan 285-330 Yuan over 330 Yuan






2007年 level 375-510 Yuan 510-615Yuan over 615 Yuan
regions Anhui, Hubei, Yunnan, Gansu Shanxi, Liaonin, Hernan,
Guangdong, Shicuan
Beijing, Jiangsu
Note: Chinese National Minimum Wage Database
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5.1 Proportions of male and female with wages below the MW level
The gender gaps of proportions of workers with wages below the MW level are shown
in Fig. 2. The proportion of workers with wages below the MW level all are greater for
females than for males in 1995 (3.2 percentage points), 2002 (1.4 percentage points)
and 2007 (2.1 percentage points).
5.2 The gender gap of the difference between wage and the MW level
We subtracted the MW level from the wage as an index to show how serious the gap is
between the wage and the MW level. A greater numerical value is associated with a
larger gap between the wage and the MW level, i.e., the more serious is the amount by
which the wage is lower than the MW level. We provide the results calculated by year,
gender and groups in Fig. 3.
In 1995, the gender gap between the wage and the MW level was 8.0 yuan. In 2002
and 2007, however, the gaps between male and female are −8.9 yuan (2002) and −22.1
yuan (2007), respectively. These calculations show that in 1995, females' wages were
considerably lower than the MW level compared with those of males; in 2002 and
2007, in contrast, males' wages were considerably lower than the MW level compared
with those of females.
6 Econometric analysis results
6.1 Estimated results of gender wage gaps in regions with different MW
Table 3 shows the estimated gender wage gaps by the regional groups. We observe
gender wage gaps in all regions through the estimated coefficient of male dummy.
First, the gender wage gap is the greatest in the high MW region; the coefficient is
0.1454, which is followed by the low MW region with an estimated coefficient of
0.1239. In the middle MW region, the gender wage gap is smallest, with an estimated
coefficient of 0.0762.
Second, the main results using the QR model are as follows. (1) Whether in the high
MW region, middle MW region or low MW region, in the lowest-wage groups (e.g.,
1st quantile), the estimated coefficients of the male dummy variable are not statistically
significant, which indicates that the gender wage gap is rather small in the low-wage
distribution. Conversely, in all regional groups whose wage distributions are greater
over the 6th quantile, the male dummy coefficients are statistically significant at 1% or
Table 2 Statistical descriptions
1995 2002 2007
Male Female F-M Male Female F-M Male Female F-M
Monthly wage 536 462 86.2% 1045 852 81.5% 1722 1271 73.8%
Education
Elementary school or less 3.6% 5.6% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 0.4% 2.2% 2.2% 0.0%
Junior high school 28.1% 32.7% 4.6% 24.3% 21.7% −2.7% 20.4% 17.0% −3.4%
Senior high school 38.9% 44.2% 5.3% 37.7% 45.1% 7.4% 35.3% 40.4% 5.1%
College 18.7% 12.5% −6.2% 23.0% 23.0% 0.0% 24.5% 27.7% 3.2%
University 10.7% 5.1% −5.6% 12.8% 7.7% −5.1% 17.6% 12.7% −5.0%
Years of experience 28 27 −2 30 27 −3 31 28 −3
Han 95.4% 95.3% 0.0 96.0% 95.9% −0.1% 97.4% 96.9% −0.5%
Married 87.1% 87.9% 0.8% 89.1% 86.6% −2.5% 88.4% 86.4% −2.0%
Ownership
SOE 86.2% 76.9% −9.3% 70.0% 64.5% −5.5% 59.4% 49.7% −9.7%
COE 12.0% 20.7% 8.7% 5.5% 9.0% 3.5% 5.1% 7.0% 1.9%
Foreign/Private Firm 1.5% 1.7% 0.2% 23.4% 23.9% 0.5% 29.3% 30.3% 1.0%
Others 0.2% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% 2.6% 1.4% 6.2% 13.1% 6.8%
Occupation
Manager 17.3% 6.3% −11.0% 19.8% 9.3% −10.5% 6.7% 2.8% −4.0%
Engineer 19.5% 22.2% 2.6% 17.8% 23.8% 6.0% 33.3% 37.5% 4.2%
Clerical staff 22.5% 23.4% 0.9% 20.4% 22.8% 2.4% 20.5% 19.1% −1.4%
Manufacturingl worker 37.7% 41.4% 3.7% 32.6% 23.1% −9.4% 23.9% 11.7% −12.2%
Others 2.9% 6.7% 3.8% 9.4% 21.0% 11.5% 15.6% 28.9% 13.3%
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 2.1% 1.3% −0.8% 1.3% 1.3% 0.0% 1.0% 0.7% −0.3%
Manufacturing 43.3% 41.7% −1.6% 26.4% 23.3% −3.1% 22.5% 15.1% −7.4%
Mining 1.2% 0.9% −0.3% 2.1% 0.8% −1.3% 1.5% 0.6% −1.0%
Construction 3.3% 2.7% −0.6% 4.2% 2.2% −2.0% 4.1% 1.8% −2.3%
Transportation/communication 5.9% 4.3% −1.6% 10.2% 5.1% −5.1% 13.6% 6.5% −7.1%
Wholesale,retail and catering 12.1% 17.3% 5.2% 9.9% 15.4% 5.5% 11.1% 18.6% 7.5%
Real estate 3.3% 4.0% 0.7% 6.0% 4.4% −1.6% 7.7% 5.3% −2.4%
Health and Social Welfare 3.6% 5.8% 2.3% 4.0% 6.7% 2.7% 3.2% 5.6% 2.4%
Education Arts and Culture 6.4% 8.0% 1.6% 8.4% 9.8% 1.3% 8.4% 10.8% 2.4%
Technical Services 2.7% 2.1% −0.6% 9.3% 15.6% 6.4% 2.6% 1.6% −1.0%
Financial Industry 1.8% 2.1% 0.3% 2.4% 3.0% 0.6% 2.9% 4.0% 1.1%
Public administration and social
organizations
13.6% 9.1% −4.5% 13.6% 10.2% −3.4% 15.1% 15.9% 0.8%
Others 0.7% 0.5% −0.1% 2.1% 2.2% 0.1% 6.4% 13.5% 7.1%
Samples 5002 4629 5473 4398 8272 6703
Source: Calculated using CHIP1995, 2002 and 2007
Notes:
1) the gender wage gaps = female wage mean values/male wage mean values
2) the gender gaps of another variables = female variable mean values-male variable mean values
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obvious. However, as the wage level increases, the gender wage gap narrows accord-
ingly, which shows that, except for groups with an extremely low-wage distribution, the
Fig. 2 Proportions of Males and Females with Wages below MW Levels. Note: Calculated results shown in
fig. 1 are the ratios of the workers whose monthly wage is below the MW level to the total workers in each
group. Source: Calculated using CHIP1995, CHIP2002, CHIP2007
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middle- and high-wage distribution groups, i.e., there is the sticky floor phenomenon.
(2) In high MW and middle MW regions in 1995, the gender wage gaps at the 1st and
3rd quantiles are not statistically significant. In 2007, however, an obvious gender wage
gap at the 3rd quantile emerges. This may be because the proportion of females with
wages lower than the MW level is greater than that of males in the early state of the
implementation of the MW (see Fig. 1).Fig. 3 Gender Gap and the Difference between Wage and MW Levels. Note: 1. Calculated results shown in
fig. 2 are the gaps of wage level and the MW in each group. 2. Wages in three periods are adjusted by CPI.
(based on 1995 national level). Source: Calculated using CHIP1995, CHIP2002, CHIP2007
Table 3 Results of gender wage gaps in regions with different MW levels
Total High MW region Middle MW region Low MW region
Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE.
1995
Mean 0.1141*** 0.0116 0.1454*** 0.0247 0.0762*** 0.0201 0.1239***
1% 0.3035 0.2239 −0.0442 0.2594 0.0908 0.3016 0.4987 0.3284
3% 0.1867*** 0.0411 0.1963 0.1409 0.2015 0.1283 0.2429*** 0.0541
6% 0.1569*** 0.0293 0.1986*** 0.0579 0.1115** 0.0474 0.1619*** 0.0328
10% 0.1431*** 0.0172 0.1747*** 0.0439 0.1358*** 0.0343 0.1303*** 0.0278
30% 0.0885*** 0.0110 0.1556*** 0.0255 0.0540** 0.0227 0.1041*** 0.0156
60% 0.0708*** 0.0113 0.1066*** 0.0230 0.0634*** 0.0176 0.0737*** 0.0111
90% 0.0714*** 0.0177 0.1238*** 0.0365 0.0440* 0.0229 0.0692*** 0.0194
2002
Mean 0.0955*** 0.0126 0.0970*** 0.0242 0.1249*** 0.0185 0.0988*** 0.0199
1% 0.0098 0.2381 0.2000 0.4666 0.1138 0.2534 −0.0921 0.2274
3% 0.1279*** 0.0452 0.1465 0.1037 0.1717** 0.0707 0.0779 0.0691
6% 0.1269*** 0.0265 0.1150** 0.0504 0.1738*** 0.0488 0.1062* 0.0624
10% 0.1120*** 0.0200 0.1345*** 0.0511 0.1302*** 0.0322 0.1260*** 0.0368
30% 0.0933*** 0.0143 0.0857*** 0.0288 0.0994*** 0.0210 0.1000*** 0.0276
60% 0.0925*** 0.0137 0.1094*** 0.0278 0.1129*** 0.0173 0.1008*** 0.0232
90% 0.0610*** 0.0220 0.0736** 0.0366 0.0952*** 0.0244 0.0583** 0.0293
2007
Mean 0.2277*** 0.0119 0.2022 0.0312 0.2612 0.0183 0.2071 0.0185
1% 0.2592 0.1646 0.1173 0.7390 0.2011 0.2572 0.3540 0.3595
3% 0.3451*** 0.0429 0.1410*** 0.1684 0.3656*** 0.0791 0.3492*** 0.0881
6% 0.3137*** 0.0271 0.2604*** 0.0723 0.3285*** 0.0365 0.3194*** 0.0558
10% 0.2803*** 0.0218 0.1769*** 0.0527 0.3172*** 0.0299 0.2871*** 0.0347
30% 0.2156*** 0.0134 0.2241*** 0.0297 0.2431*** 0.0178 0.2141*** 0.0276
60% 0.2181*** 0.0145 0.2396*** 0.0335 0.2383*** 0.0195 0.1751*** 0.0186
90% 0.2319*** 0.0190 0.1961*** 0.0438 0.2921*** 0.0333 0.1442*** 0.0275
Note:
1. Coefficients of the male dummy are showed in Table 3 (The other varibles are education, experience years, han race
and the married dummy)
2. OLS based on wage mean, the results of 1% ~ 90% wage distribution are estimated using quantile regression model
3. *, **, *** statistically significant in 10%, 5%, 1% levels
Source: Calculated using CHIP1995, CHIP2002, CHIP2007
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To compare the effects of MW level and Kaitz Index on males and females’ wage, we
made the estimation by Model 1 (MW level model) and Model 2 (Kaitz Index model).
The analysis results were obtained with OLS and the quantile regression model. The
simulation results are shown in Fig. 4.
Seen from the estimated results of average value, if the MW level rises by 1 yuan, the
increase of males and females’ average wages are 3.2 yuan and 2.7 yuan, respectively,
showing that the rise in the MW level has a slightly greater effect on males’ average
wage than on females’ average wage. Seen from the estimated results of the wage quan-
tile, only in the extreme low-wage distribution (e.g., 1st and 3rd quantile groups) does
the rise in the MW standard have a slightly greater effect on females’ average wages
Fig. 4 Impact of MW Level on Males and Females’ Wages. Note: 1. These are the simulation results showing
wage rise level if the MW rise 100 Yuan. 2. OLS based on mean, the results of 1 percentile ~90 percentile
are estimated using quantile regression model. Source: Calculated using CHIP1995, CHIP2002, CHIP2007.
Li and Ma IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:20 Page 12 of 22than on males’ average wages. However, the opposite is the case in groups of other
wage quantiles (e.g., the groups at middle/high wage levels); particularly in the high-
wage group (e.g., the group in the 90th quantile wage), the rise in the MW level has
greater effect on males’ wages.
6.3 Decomposition results of gender wage gaps
The results in Fig. 4 above show that the effect of the MW level on male and female
wage levels differ from one another. To understand further the impact of the MW level
on gender wage gap, we conducted the decomposition analysis for the gender wage gap
by using the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition model. Considering that the Kaitz Index
may affect the gender wage gap, we also provide the decomposition result based on
Kaitz Index. See the decomposition result in Table 4.
Above all, seen from the overall decomposition result, the effect of a difference
in endowment return on gender wage gap is greater than that of endowment dif-
ferentials. For example, in 1995, the difference in endowment return is 57.0% and
the endowment difference is 43.0%; in 2007, the former is 36.5% and the latter is
63.5%. The analysis result based on Kaitz Index also shows that, in both 1995 and
2007, the differences in endowment return are greater than endowment differen-
tials. In 1995, the former is 56.3% and the latter is 43.7%; in 2007, the former is
60.5% and the latter is 39.5%. Both composition results indicate that, from 1995 to
2007, the effect of differences in endowment return has increased. The increase in
impact of differences in endowment return on gender wage gap shall be brought
to the forefront because one of its causes lies in the increase in terms of effect of
gender discrimination.
Now, we discuss the effect of MW level on gender wage gaps. In 1995, the endow-
ment difference of the MW was 0.7%, and the difference in endowment return of the
MW was −12.5%, showing that the gender wage gap is caused by that proportion of
males in the regions whose relatively high MW level is greater than those of females.
The reason that the impact of the MW level on wage is greater for females than for
males comes from the narrowing of the gender wage gap. Compared with the situation
in 1995, the status is reversed in 2002. In 2002, the endowment difference of the MW
level is −3.0%, and its difference in endowment return is 8.7%. These numbers show
that the reason that the proportion of workers in the regions with relatively high MW
level is greater for females than for males is the narrowing of the gender wage gap, and
Table 4 Decomposition results of the gender wage gaps






Female loss (a) Male gain (b) Total (a + b) Female loss (a) Male gain (b) Total (a + b)
1995
100% Decomposition results of each factor 43.0% 29.9% 27.1% 57.0% 43.7% 29.5% 26.8% 56.3%
The MW 0.7% −5.4% −7.1% −12.5%
Kaitz Index −1.3% 45.9% 40.7% 86.6%
Education 13.1% −3.0% −0.1% −3.1% 14.7% −0.6% 1.3% 0.7%
Experience years 8.5% −125.2% −79.5% −204.7% 9.0% −131.0% −86.6% −217.6%
Race 0.0% −16.9% −12.4% −29.3% 0.0% −17.3% −13.3% −30.6%
Married −0.4% 39.3% 43.1% 82.4% −0.3% 44.0% 47.1% 91.1%
Ownership 9.2% −2.0% 1.9% −0.1% 10.2% −2.1% 1.8% −0.3%
Occupation 9.3% 11.0% 6.9% 17.9% 9.0% 7.2% 4.3% 11.5%
Industry 2.6% −3.8% 1.0% −2.8% 2.4% −5.1% 0.0% −5.1%
Constant term 0.0% 135.8% 73.3% 209.1% 0.0% 88.5% 31.5% 120.0%
2002
100% Decomposition results of each factor 48.8% 28.6% 22.6% 51.2% 52.9% 26.2% 20.9% 47.1%
The MW −3.0% 2.4% 6.3% 8.7%
Kaitz Index −1.8% 18.3% 5.7% 24.0%
Education 6.3% 2.1% −1.2% 0.9% 7.0% 2.4% −0.2% 2.2%
Experience years 15.6% −13.9% −4.8% −18.7% 20.8% −20.0% −14.0% −34.0%
Race 0.0% 23.2% 20.8% 44.0% 0.0% 25.9% 21.3% 47.2%
Married 1.3% 20.4% 27.6% 48.0% 0.5% 19.0% 27.6% 46.6%
Ownership 6.6% −1.3% −0.4% −1.7% 6.2% −1.7% −0.6% −2.3%
















Table 4 Decomposition results of the gender wage gaps (Continued)
Industry 4.1% 6.9% 1.1% 8.0% 5.8% 5.0% −0.6% 4.4%
Constant term 0.0% −18.1% −25.0% −43.1% 0.0% −29.6% −18.5% −48.1%
2007
100% Decomposition results of each factor 36.5% 35.2% 28.3% 63.5% 39.5% 33.4% 27.1% 60.5%
The MW 1.2% 1.7% 6.4% 8.1%
Kaitz Index −0.5% −12.5% −4.3% −16.8%
Education 3.3% 2.7% −6.0% −3.3% 3.6% 2.7% −5.0% −2.3%
Experience years 4.1% −21.1% −0.9% −22.0% 7.4% −13.8% 7.9% −5.9%
Race 0.2% −2.4% −4.7% −7.1% 0.1% −4.3% −6.0% −10.3%
Married 0.8% 23.0% 24.7% 47.7% 0.5% 18.1% 19.4% 37.5%
Ownership 14.3% −6.7% 0.4% −6.3% 14.1% −7.5% −0.5% −8.0%
Occupation 4.4% 4.0% −3.5% 0.5% 4.8% 5.3% −1.9% 3.4%
Industry 8.2% −2.2% 1.5% −0.7% 9.5% −5.1% −1.3% −6.4%
Constant term 0.0% 36.2% 10.5% 46.7% 0.0% 50.5% 18.7% 69.2%
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wages for males than for females. In 2007, both the endowment difference and differ-
ence in endowment return of the MW level are positive values, i.e., 1.2% (endowment
difference) and 8.1% (difference in endowment return). These differences reveal that
for both factors, the proportion of workers in the regions with relatively high MW level
is greater for males than for females and that the MW level has greater impact on
wages for males than for females, affecting the gender wage gap. The decomposition
results of all three periods show that the gender difference in terms of the effect of the
MW level on the wage (difference in endowment return) has a greater effect than
the gender difference of the distribution in the regions with different MW levels
(endowment difference).
Finally, we discuss the effect of the Kaitz Index on gender wage gap. In 1995, the
endowment difference of the Kaitz Index is −1.3% and the difference in endow-
ment return of the Kaitz Index is 86.6%. These results reveal that the reason that
the proportion of workers in the regions with a relatively high Kaitz Index is
greater for males than females is the narrowing gender wage gap, and the gender
wage gap is caused by the Kaitz Index having a greater effect on wages for males
than for females. In 2002, the direction of the Kaitz Index has an effect on gender
wage gap similar to that in 1995; for example, the endowment difference of the
Kaitz Index is −1.8% and the difference in endowment return of the Kaitz Index is
24.0%. Note that, compared with 1995, the reason that the Kaitz Index has a
greater effect on wages for males than for females is that its effect decreased. In
2007, both the endowment difference and difference in endowment return of the
Kaitz Index are negative values, i.e., −0.5% (endowment difference) and −16.8%
(difference in endowment return). These changes have two causes: the proportion
of females in the regions with relatively higher MW level is greater than that of
males, and the Kaitz Index has greater effect on females’ wage level, thus having
an effect on narrowing the gender wage gap. The decomposition results of all three
periods show that the gender difference in terms of the effect of the Kaitz Index on the
wage (difference in endowment return) has a greater effect than does the gender differ-
ence of distribution in regions with different Kaitz Indexes (endowment difference).
6.4 DID analysis results of gender wage gaps
To further examine the effects of the MW implementation on gender wage gap, we also
conducted DID analysis. See Table 5 (OLS) and Table 6(QR) for these results.
First, the effects of the MW on gender wage gap varied by period (Table 5). For ex-
ample, the results in 1990–2007, 1991–2007 and 1992–2007 all showed that the MW
implementation contributed to narrowing the gender wage gap. However, in other
periods (such as 1990–1995 and 1990–2002), the effects of the MW on gender wage
gap are statistically insignificant. These results indicate that the MW implementation
contributes to narrowing the gender wage gap in the long term, but this effect is not
obvious in the short term.
Second, the MW has a more noticeable effect on narrowing gender wage gap in
low-wage and mid-wage groups (Table 6) in comparison with high-wage groups.
However, the MW has a more significant effect on narrowing gender wage gap in
the low-wage group, which is possibly because that increase of MW level has the
Table 5 DID analysis results—based on OLS estimations
1990 vs. 1995 1990 vs. 2002 1990 vs. 2007
The initial years: 1990 Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE.
Male 0.1327*** 0.0123 0.1552*** 0.0135 0.1404*** 0.0086
year 0.0062 0.0140 0.4767*** 0.0194 0.7921*** 0.0146
The treatment group −0.2598*** 0.0233 −0.0947*** 0.0183 −0.2110*** 0.0198
Male*year 0.0319* 0.0181 0.0420* 0.0253 0.1616*** 0.0185
Male*The treatment group 0.0649** 0.0309 −0.1097*** 0.0247 0.1361*** 0.0254
year*The treatment −0.0817** 0.0385 −0.0144 0.0344 0.1712*** 0.0409
DIDterm −0.0077 0.0503 0.0572 0.0468 −0.1125** 0.0508
1991 vs. 1995 1991 vs. 2002 1991 vs. 2007
The initial years: 1991 Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE.
Male 0.1249*** 0.0133 0.1603*** 0.0185 0.1194*** 0.0112
year 0.0207 0.0142 0.4845*** 0.0214 0.8015*** 0.0155
The treatment group −0.2753*** 0.0230 −0.1201*** 0.0223 −0.1263*** 0.0206
Male*year 0.0106 0.0191 0.0332 0.0284 0.1800*** 0.0199
Male*The treatment group 0.0252 0.0312 −0.1335*** 0.0313 0.1060*** 0.0306
year*The treatment −0.0819** 0.0383 0.0107 0.0367 0.0866** 0.0412
DIDterm −0.0568 0.0504 0.0809 0.0506 −0.0803 + 0.0536
1992 vs. 1995 1992 vs. 2002 1992 vs. 2007
The initial years: 1992 Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE. Coeff. SE.
Male 0.1232*** 0.0133 0.1429*** 0.0187 0.1209*** 0.0110
year −0.0525*** 0.0141 0.4128*** 0.0214 0.7325*** 0.0153
The treatment group −0.2555*** 0.0217 −0.1353*** 0.0229 −0.1432*** 0.0210
Male*year 0.0150 0.0191 0.0529* 0.0285 0.1809*** 0.0198
Male*The treatment group 0.1262*** 0.0303 −0.1127*** 0.0325 0.1174*** 0.0298
year*The treatment −0.1364*** 0.0383 0.0256 0.0370 0.1028** 0.0413
DIDterm −0.0548 0.0496 0.0593 0.0513 −0.0922* 0.0531
Note:
1. Estimations using Kaitz index in models. Treatment group: the region where the gender wage gap is lowest before the
MW implementation, and the Kaitz index is higher after the MW implementation
2. The other varibles such as education, experience years,han race,married are also estimated
3. *, **, *** statistically significant in 10%,5%,1% levels
Source: Calculated using CHIP1995,CHIP2002,CHIP2007
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lower than MW level). Therefore, if there are more female than male workers at
approximately the MW level, the increase of the MW level can narrow a gender
wage gap. Figure 1 shows that, in three periods, the proportion of workers having
wages lower than the MW level is greater for females than males. The related
figures are 3.1 (1995), 1.4 (2002) and 2.1 (2007) percentage points. Why does the
MW contribute to narrowing the gender wage gap of mid-wage groups? It may be due to
the spread effect brought by a wage increase for low-wage groups (this effect is called “the
spillover effect” of the MW); in other words, the wage of mid-wage groups will go up
when that of low-wage groups goes up. The analysis results indicate that, in China’s urban
labor market, the increased MW level has influenced not only the lower-wage workers
whose wage approaches the MW level but also wage levels to a significant extent.
Table 6 DID analysis results-based on quantile regression estimations
1% 3% 6% 10% 30% 60% 90%
Estimation 1: 1990–2007
Male 0.4422*** 0.2035*** 0.2128*** 0.1682*** 0.1222*** 0.1111*** 0.1051***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2002 0.5500*** 0.4569*** 0.5691*** 0.5613*** 0.6611*** 0.8523*** 1.0342***
(0.17) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
The treatment group −0.7978*** 0.0713 −0.1811*** −0.1427*** −0.1868*** −0.2071*** −0.2191***
(0.23) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male*2002 0.0314 0.1528** 0.1699*** 0.2398*** 0.2270*** 0.1502*** 0.1279***
(0.22) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 0.02
Male*The treatment
group
0.9070*** −0.0695 0.1269* 0.0933* 0.1007*** 0.1074*** 0.1466***
(0.32) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
2002*The treatment
group
1.2952*** −0.0884 0.1387 0.1859** 0.2392*** 0.1778*** 0.0311
(0.49) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
DIDterm −1.0092 + 0.3830* 0.0767 −0.0594 −0.1357** −0.1329*** −0.1074*
(0.64) (0.21) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Estimation 2: 1991–2007
Male 0.3238** 0.1477*** 0.1267*** 0.0947*** 0.1058*** 0.1084*** 0.1221***
(0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
2007 0.3839** 0.4934*** 0.5300*** 0.5603*** 0.6992*** 0.8726*** 1.0636***
(0.19) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
The treatment group 0.4178 0.0951 0.0212 −0.0655 −0.1340*** −0.1794*** −0.1497***
(0.35) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Male*2007 0.1083 0.1845*** 0.2462*** 0.3133*** 0.2370*** 0.1620*** 0.0891***
(0.25) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Male*The treatment
group
−0.2488 −0.0211 0.0474 0.0868 0.0848* 0.1194*** 0.1394**
(0.47) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
2007*The treatment
group
−0.0204 −0.1441 −0.0441 0.1129 0.1796*** 0.1606*** −0.0536
(0.56) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
DIDterm 0.2135 0.3710** 0.1540 −0.0571 −0.1155 −0.1542** −0.0654
(0.74) (0.19) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Estimation 3: 1992–2007
Male 0.2417 0.2588*** 0.1727*** 0.1212*** 0.1189*** 0.1166*** 0.1169***
(0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
2007 0.2376 0.5811*** 0.4781*** 0.4874*** 0.6212*** 0.8106*** 1.0110***
(0.19) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
The treatment group 0.2146 −0.3440*** −0.0263 −0.0801* −0.1489*** −0.1802*** −0.1702***
(0.34) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Male*2007 0.2195 0.0831 0.2087*** 0.2808*** 0.2264*** 0.1512*** 0.1060***
(0.24) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Male*The treatment
group
−0.0364 0.3459*** 0.0672 0.0678 0.0782* 0.1153*** 0.1342***
(0.45) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Li and Ma IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:20 Page 17 of 22
Table 6 DID analysis results-based on quantile regression estimations (Continued)
2007*The treatment
group
0.1879 0.2933* −0.0157 0.1319* 0.2049*** 0.1544*** −0.0319
(0.55) (0.16) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
DIDterm 0.0100 −0.0103 0.1452 −0.0351 −0.1187* −0.1429** −0.0684
(0.72) (0.21) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Note:
l. The other variables such as education, experience years,han race,married are also estimated
2. SE values are showed in ( )
3. +, *, **, *** statistically significant in 15%, 10%, 5%, 1% levels
Source: Calculated using CHIP1995, CHIP2002, CHIP2007
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In urban China, the gender wage gap was small during the period of planned economy;
however, during the economy transition period, particularly after the 1990s, when SOEs
were further reformed, the gender wage gap gradually increased. Conversely, the
Chinese government has been officially implementing the MW system since 1993. The
implementation of the MW policy contributes to increasing incomes of low-wage
groups. Therefore, if the proportion of workers with wages lower than the MW level is
greater for females than for males, the MW may narrow gender wage gap. This paper
provides evidence on whether the MW has had an effect on gender wage gaps in urban
China using CHIP1995, 2002 and 2007. Several major conclusions emerge.
First, by the descriptive statistical analysis, we had the following two findings. (1) In
1995, 2002 and 2007, the proportion of workers with wages lower than the MW level
was greater for females than for males. (2) The gaps between wages and the MW level
for males and females are different during three periods. In addition, the local MW
levels in different regions influence males and females’ wages differently.
Second, the gender wage gap is largest in regions with high MW levels, and smallest
in regions with middle MW levels. Although the gender wage gap is not obvious at the
extremely low-wage distribution (e.g., in the 1st quantile), in wage distributions in
which quantile is higher than 6th, the gender wage gap tends to narrow with increasing
wage levels, showing that there is a sticky floor phenomenon.
Furthermore, the decomposition results using the Oaxaca-Ransom model show that
gender differences in returns on endowments in the MW levels and Kaitz Index have a
greater influence on gender wage gap, in comparison with gender differences in
endowments.
Finally, the results obtained by DID analysis model show that, in the long term,
implementation of a MW system contributes to narrowing gender wage gap and that
such an effect in a low-wage group is more significant than that in a high wage group.
However, that effect is not obvious in the short term.
Although according to these empirical analysis, we can conclude that the MW imple-
mentation contributes to narrowing gender wage gap in the long term, there are three
points worthy of attention. First, the analysis results show that MW started to contrib-
ute to narrowing the gender wage gap after the MW system had been implemented for
15–17 years (1990, 1991, 1992–2007) and that the gender wage gap had hardly been
influenced during a shorter period of implementation of this system. Why does the
long-term effect differ from the short-term effect? It is necessary to extend the analysis
in the future. This may be because we could only use the quasi-DID model instead of
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wage gap at an extremely low-wage distribution, which may be related to a greater pro-
portion of females at the low-wage distribution. To further analyze the causes of gender
wage gap at the low-wage distribution is a promising area of issues for discussion, such
as an in-depth investigation of females’ poverty.
Third, although this paper only discusses the MW effect on gender wage gaps, there
may be gender gap effects of unemployment and informality (Hunt 2002; Muravyev and
Oshchepkov 2013).17There are many factors influencing female labor participation such
as household structure, macro-economic environment, firm recruitment, and employ-
ment system, so detailed empirical studies on this issue should be done in the future.
Endnotes
1For other empirical studies on the gender wage gap that don't focus on the MW
effect, please see Gustafsson and Li (2000), Li and Ma (2006), Li and Song (2013), Ma
(2008 and 2010).
2Regarding the debate on the MW employment effect in the 1980s, it is indicated that
there is a negative significant but modest −1% to −3% employment effect (Brown, et al.,
1982). After the 1990s, using cross-section data, Meyer and Wise (1983a, b) Neumark
and Wascher (1992, 2000 and 2004); Deere et al. (1995); Currie and Fallick (1996) and
Burkhauser et al. (2000) also found results consistent with the standard model predic-
tion of a negative employment effect. On the other hand, using panel data to conduct
quasi-natural experiment studies, Card (1992a,1992b); Katz and Krueger (1992); Card
and Krueger (1995) pointed out that there are no unemployment effects. Similarly,
there is no consensus on the effect of MW on employment.
3We apply Chinese National Minimum Wage Databases to classify the regions by the
MWLevel; the regions are shown in Table 1.
4Another approach to investigating regional differences in the gender wage gap is to
use the cross term of males and regions. However, such an approach compares based
on the assumption that there is the same endowment of human capital in each region,
which allows for variables with assumptions but is not very realistic. We therefore relax
the limiting conditions to estimate by region groups. Anyone who is interested in the
results of using cross term may contact the author directly.
5The Oaxaca-Blinder composition method can be expressed with the following two
equations. Please note that the coefficient estimates and average of variables used in
Eqs. (10) and (11) are different.
1nWm−1nWf ¼ βm Xm−Xf
 þ βm−βf Xf ð10Þ
 
1nWm−1nWf ¼ βf Xf −Xm
 þ βf −βm Xm ð11Þ
6Strictly speaking, the decomposition value here does not represent discrimination as
a whole because it also contains a part of the gap resulting from some interpreted
variables that cannot be observed, for example, working attitude and abilities.
Li and Ma IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:20 Page 20 of 227The Kaitz index is defined as the ratio of the MW to the average wage of the
working population.
8Please note that we can use only the quasi-DID model rather than the real DID
model. The main reason is that the Chinese government published the Minimum Wage
Regulations for Enterprises in 1993, and the MW policy was carried out in all regions
(provinces) covered by the CHIP survey. In other words, we cannot find the real con-
trol group (the province in which the MW is not implemented during two compared
periods). Therefore, we applied this alternative method.
9Meyer (1995, pp.l57–158) noted that to improve the robustness of the quasi-natural
experiment model, the use of multiple treatment groups and multiple comparison
groups is the development direction of future quasi-natural experiments. Based on that
statement, this paper has made full use of the characteristics of CHIP data and selected
multiple treatment groups and control groups when applying the DID method.
10Based on the definition proposed in this paper, we use Hernan (1990 vs. 1995),
Hubei (1990 vs. 2002), Shanxi (1990 vs. 2007), Shanxi (1991 vs. 1995), Hubei (1991 vs.
1992), Shanxi (1991 vs. 2007), Shanxi (1992 vs. 1995), Hubei (1992 vs. 2002), Shanxi
(1992 vs. 2007) as treatment groups.
11There may be representative error when make the master sample by consolidating
the data in each region. Therefore, the weight can be used for adjustment. However, it
is not applied in this paper, first, because CHIP is applied by the NBS according to a
national survey sample. It is a stratified multiple stage sample in which the master sam-
ple consolidating error arising from the difference in sample number in regions can be
forecast to be very small. Second, according to the calculation of Li and Song (2013),
the population census data in 2000 and 1% population census data against CHIP2002
and CHIP2007 are used as the weight. The adjusted results are the same as the results
without being adjusted. Moreover, no relevant data against CHIP1995 can be used to
correct it. For more details regarding this point, please see Li and Song (2013, note 1).
12According to the MW Article published in 1993, the main content of the MW con-
sist of total earnings from work (except the overtime hours subsidy), any risk job sub-
sidy and social security subsidy. We cannot distinguish the detail subsidy items from
CHIP data. We also made an analysis using the basic wage. The results are similar to
the results using the total wage. Therefore, we show the results using total wage in this
paper. The earnings data does not include unofficial payments, and if such payments
are more likely to be made to men, the gender wage gap will be underestimated.
13We calculated the total values of the material objects and added them to wage
accounts.
14There are two reasons for using the logarithm of monthly wage as the explained
variable.First, there is only monthly wage information in the CHIP 2007; therefore, we
calculated monthly wage using CHIP1995 and CHIP2002. Second, the MW standard
for a regular worker in each region is defined based on a monthly wage. The data of
the urban worker in the CHIP we use is dominated by regular worker data, so we per-
form the analysis by taking the regular worker as the object according to the MW
standard based on monthly wage. Therefore, we use the corresponding logarithm of
the monthly wage as the explained variable in the wage function.
15In China, college courses are for three years whereas university courses are over
four years.
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17Hunt (2002) shows that with a fall in the gender wage gaps, the unemployment of
low-skilled women increased in Germany. Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2013) further
indicates the effects of MW on the informality and unemployment in Russian regions.
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